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Abstract The incomplete devolution of taxation pow-
ers to English Local Government has been constrained
by central government’s doubling of reductions in prop-
erty taxes for small firms. The aim is to stimulate local
growth, but we question the economic logic.We analyse
reductions in place since 2005, with a newly linked
dataset for all firms that incorporate administrative data
down to local units. We find the reductions do not
overcome supposed market failures, do not stimulate
job growth and once we control for firm age, that the
targeted small firms do not produce extra employment.
Young firms and larger firms have better growth rates,
but there is no systematic size effect. We conclude that
the tax reductions fail because they do not account for
tax capitalisation (i.e. incidence shifts from firms to
property owners), the basic characteristics of the average
small firm or develop a clear mechanism for change
among heterogeneous economic actors.
Keywords Local Property Taxation . Capitalisation .
Devolution . Growth . Firm age
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1 Introduction
The UK Government announced the “end of the nation-
al tax on local growth” (HM Treasury 2016 p. 9) in the
autumn of 2015. The Government planned to devolve
the setting and administration of English1 Business
Rates (BR), a property-based tax historically levied on
all firms, from the national to local governments in
2020.2 A principal element of this policy was greater
local flexibility to reduce (not increase) rates set nation-
ally for specific projects or types of firms and stimulate
local growth. Yet, in the March 2017 Budget, the same
national Government undermined this flexibility. The
Government significantly expanded and made perma-
nent the current policy of National (English) reductions
in the property tax for small firms (called Small Busi-
ness Rate Reliefs or SBRR). The reductions now re-
move 600,000 firms (i.e. one third of all firms) from
local tax bases and will reduce revenue by £9bn over
5 years (HM Treasury 2017). This raises concerns about
future revenue, greater reliance on a small number of
large firms and restrictions on local autonomy to achieve
local objectives.
Small Bus Econ
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-019-00219-9
1 Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have slightly different BR
systems and devolved responsibility, which mean these plans do not
necessarily apply to these nations.
2 The timetable for the devolution of local finance has become unclear
following the unexpected national elections in June 2017, which
interrupted the legislative progress of the Local Government Finance
Bill 2017. 50% Retention of BR began in April 2013, with 50%
returned to central government for redistribution. Increasingly BR
funds local activities, but the ability to vary rates is restricted and
infrequently employed.
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The policy to expand and reduce the property tax
follows a persistent campaign by the small business
community. The then PrimeMinister told the Federation
of Small business in 2014 that small business’ number 1
complaint was Business Rates, which had risen relative
to other costs (Adam and Miller 2014; Cabinet Office
2014). In April 2017, we also saw a vociferous cam-
paign against BR increases in areas such as London that
led to some minor changes in that year’s budget. Yet, at
the same time, there were offsetting declines in rates
across most of the country given the instruments reve-
nue neutral structure, which received much less
attention.
The narratives supporting this high profile policy
draw together preconceptions about the universal nega-
tive effects of tax on firm growth and small firms’
transformative growth potential, both of which are su-
perficially plausible. In a novel combination of econom-
ic literatures, we question the theoretical and empirical
cogency of these arguments using rich newly linked
micro data. In support of SBRR, introduced in 2005, it
is argued (e.g. repeated in HM Treasury 2016) that BR
forms a greater proportion of small firm’s fixed costs
than those of large firms and limits their ability to
compete or innovate. This is not a sufficient condition
for differential tax reductions unless there is a greater
social benefit from small firm’s growth and becomes
immaterial, if through tax capitalisation,3 the economic
cost/benefit transfer to property owners.
We first address the policymechanism and contribute
to the tax capitalisation literature by exploring where the
economic incidence falls and hence how the tax reduc-
tion could generate growth or innovation. Secondly, we
explore the policy’s target of small firms, which is based
on the perception small firms contribute more to em-
ployment levels than their share of gross value added.
This is a fundamental issue, as whether firm size has a
systematic effect on employment has not been clearly
resolved for the UK (Hijzen et al. 2010).
Critical to our novel combination of literature and
analysis of the current tax reductions is our access to rich
administrative data. We base our analysis on the Office
of National Statistics (ONS, 2016) Annual Respondents
Database X (ARDx). The ONS recently (July 2016)
released this dataset, which is a combination of the
Annual Business Inquiry and the subsequent Annual
Business Survey. These are the largest datasets collected
by the ONS, as they are an annual census of large firms
and a sample of smaller ones. Importantly, they include
firm level administrative data on employment and turn-
over at both local unit and parent firm levels, making it a
reliable and rich source, which overcomes a number of
limitations on earlier work.
Our analysis of the tax reductions in place between
2005 and 2014 shows these tax reductions have not
enabled any growth in employment; in fact, we argue
that there is no feasible channel through which they
could. We then show that even if there were a mecha-
nism the principal recipients, small old firms, are the
least likely to be the catalyst for local employment
growth. These findings bring into question the
Treasury’s homogeneous micro management of local
property taxes.
We structure this paper in the following manner. In
Sect. 2, we describe BR and their relevance. In Sect. 3,
we discuss the two strands of theory that this policy
combines on capitalisation and employment growth and
confront them with the existing empirical evidence. In
Sect. 4, we describe the data source, and in Sect. 5, we
discuss the estimation framework. We report the find-
ings in Sect. 6 and then conclude.
2 The business rates system
Business Rates (officially known as Non Domestic
Rates) is a tax levied on all occupiers of commercial
properties based on the property’s estimated rental val-
ue. BR constitute a significant UK tax instrument, which
raised £29bn in the 2017 tax year (Office of Budget
Responsibility 2017). For context, this is equivalent to
over half that raised by the more widely analysed Cor-
poration Tax. The UK is the most reliant country in the
OECD on property taxes. In 2015, the UK collected
13% of tax revenue from properties (including domestic
property), whilst the OECD average was 6% (OECD
2017). BR are particularly salient to the business com-
munity because the statutory incidence falls on all com-
mercial property occupiers rather than the property
owners and consequently they perceive it as a substan-
tial additional fixed cost. However, we argue below that
this is a perception given economic incidence ultimately
transfers to property owners following capitalisation
into rents.
3 Capitalisation in this case, is when economic incidence of SBRR
passes backwards to the property owner via offsetting rent (property
price) increases.
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Prior to 1990, each local government set its own BR;
however, since 1990, central government (and latterly
devolved governments of the UK nations) has this pow-
er. The Valuation Office Agency (VOA) assesses the
rateable value (RV) of each commercial property based
on type of property, location, some types of installed
machinery and other specified factors. The VOA re-
values RVs on a 5-year cycle, except for the 2010–
2015 cycle, which was extended to 2017. The 2010
revaluation was based on 2008 valuations.
Firms pay a proportion (multiplier) of the RV, e.g. for
the financial years 2013–2014, it was 47.1%. This can
constitute a significant fixed cost and underscores the
salience to firms. As and when BR are devolved, local
governments would use the setting of the multiplier to
encourage specific economic or social activities. Until
April 2018, the annual increases in the multiplier were
limited to increases in the Retail Price Index (RPI).
Following wider pressure, they are now linked to the
generally lower Consumer Price Index, rather than the
RPI or indeed underlying property valuations.
The Local Government Act of 2003 introduced
Small Business Rate Relief (SBRR) from 2005, until
then BRwas principally a flat tax. This relief (reduction)
is partially funded by a supplement on the BR of firms
occupying properties with slightly higher RVs. Initially,
the supplement was on RVs above £15,000 (£21,500 in
the city of London) then from 2010 above £18,000
(£25,000) and from 2017 above £51,000. The SBRR
started at 50% for properties with RVs up to £5000 and
tapered to zero at £10,000. In 2010, SBRR increased to
100% for properties with RVs up to £6000 and tapered
to zero at £12,000. This increase was for 1 year, but
following pressure became permanent. As discussed in
the introduction, the government brought forward the
doubling of reliefs from 2020 to 2017. The 100%
threshold rose to £12,000 and tapered to zero at
£15,000. This change increased from 400,000 to
600,000 the number of firms not paying BR and
900,000 (approximately half of all firms) receiving
some reduction. The cumulative 5-year reduction in
revenue of this and other changes from 2017 is estimat-
ed at £9 billion (HM Treasury 2016b, 2017).
Table 1 provides a summary of the SBRR in
England for the period we study. The nominal value
of the relief rose rapidly to over £1 billion in 2014–
2015, more than double the value in 2010–2011 and
quadruple the 2007–2008 revenue loss. The supple-
ment paid by firms in more expensive properties has
consistently failed to cover 50% of this relief; yet, the
multiplier supplement has risen from 0.82% in 2009–
2010 to 2.3% in 2014–2015.
3 Policy debate and literature review
This growth policy through reductions in property tax-
ation covers two bodies of theory and empirical evi-
dence, one for the policy mechanism and one for the
economic group driving the desired growth. First, the
policy’s homogenous changes in taxation for small
firms putatively overcome market failure, from
financial and market power constraints. Givord et al.
(2013) suggest that relative to larger firms, small firms
tend to be financially constrained and this may mean
they are more responsive to tax incentives. Secondly, the
government focuses these reliefs on small firms occu-
pying cheaper properties. This focus reflects policy
makers’ heuristic position (Shane 2009), from which
entrants and small firms can transform depressed eco-
nomic regions, as they are believed to be more innova-
tive and create more jobs than larger established firms.
We argue that both the mechanism and the choice of the
target group are poorly defined.
Small Business Economics has nurtured a robust and
wide-ranging debate on the linkages between taxation or
subsidies and entrepreneurial activity and this has gen-
erally found that neither is critical to future growth
(Holtz-Eakin, 2000, b; Bruce and Mohsin 2006;
Fotopoulos and Storey 2018). Although others who
have examined general taxation rates (Baliamoune-Lutz
and Garello 2014), corporation and income taxation
(Nam and Radulescu 2007; Darnihamedani et al.
2018) or innovative forms of support (Henrekson and
Sanandaji 2018) have identified institutional sets up in
which tax (subsidy) incentives can assist start up or
investment decisions. We extend this debate in a new
direction through our examination of property taxes and
job growth.
Occupiers lobby against BR because they face the
statutory responsibility for payment but ultimately there
is little evidence they face the economic incidence.
Policy maker’s failure to differentiate between the stat-
utory and economic incidence of the instrument leads
them to accept it distorts the decisions of small firms.
However, taxation theory (e.g. Stiglitz and Rosengard
2015; Fischel et al. 2011) illustrates how property taxes
will fall on the owners of immobile factors, land and
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buildings, ceteris paribus. Property prices and rents then
reflect differences in taxes, with lower taxes increasing
the purchase price of property if the statutory incidence
falls on the property owner or increasing the level of rent
occupants are willing to pay if it falls on the occupant.
Whichever the statutory incidence, the relative immo-
bility of the capital would see capitalisation, i.e. eco-
nomic incidence passes backwards to the property own-
er. Rents and taxation do not move independently but
combine to give a total cost threshold for occupation. If
basic theory holds then there would be no social benefit
from SBRR as it is captured by property owners, a group
very different to the perceived beneficiaries.4
Bond et al. (1996)5 provide one of the few papers on
BR post 1990. They examine the 1990 change from
local government rates to the national uniform BR using
rental data for a sample of 2964 properties between
1987 and 1992. They show rents fell in response to
BR rises more than in areas that saw a fall in BR during
this transition period. They do not reject a pound for
pound negative relationship between rents and BR, al-
though with a wide confidence interval.6 Bond et al.
(1996) thought institutional rigidities in the frequency of
rent reviews, typically at 5-year intervals in UK com-
mercial property agreements, implied full capitalisation
of changes would take a number of years. Yet, over a
short 2-year period, they find that there is a significant
incidence on rents from changes in BR for retail prop-
erties. This would suggest there is only a short window
in which any variation in BR could influence employ-
ment or other outcomes.
Duranton et al. (2011) reinforce this finding on
capitalisation of BR, although they also show some
negative effect of higher rates on expansion. The authors
apply innovative spatial methods to BR during 1984–
1989, when local governments previously set rates.
They focus on large English manufacturing establish-
ments and find BR had a significant negative impact on
Table 1 Business Rates Collected by Councils in England: 2005 to 2015 £ million (nominal values)
Year 2005–
2006
2006–
2007
2007–
2008
2008–
2009
2009–
2010
2010–
2011
2011–
2012
2012–
2013
2013–
2014
2014–
2015
Net value of BR collected 15,677 16,853 17,138 18,722 19,039 18,927 20,661 21,352 20,541 21,610
Cost of SBRR granted Not pub Not pub − 259.9 − 298.2 − 333.2 − 506.5 − 784.3 − 900.3 − 985.9 − 1061.5
Business funding of SBRRa Not pub Not pub 132.3 176.3 176.6 372.8 375.6 399.2 447 543.2
Net SBRRb 104 57 − 147.8 − 144.8 − 187.9 − 162.5 − 432.1 − 550 − 590.5 − 580
SBRR multiplier (pence)a 41.5 42.6 44.1 45.8 48.1 40.7 42.6 45 46.2 47.1
BR multiplier (pence)a 42.2 43.3 44.4 46.2 48.5 41.4 43.3 45.8 47.1 48.2
Additional multiplier to fund
SBRR (pence)
0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1
Number of properties (000) 1651 1663 1681 1692 1698 1718 1735 1759 1771 1787
Total rateable valuec 46,280 47,094 47,314 46,888 46,721 56,337 57,864 57,178 57,154 57,069
£ million (nominal)
Negative figures indicate relief being given
BR business rates, Not pub not published
a The Small business rate multiplier applied to firms with rateable value below £15,000 (city of London £21,500) between the financial years
2005–2006 and 2009–2010. From 2010 to 2011, the thresholds rose to £18,000 (city of London £25,000). The national Domestic (standard)
rate applies from this threshold and incorporates a supplement for the Small Business Rate Relief
b Includes adjusts with respect to any previous year
c This figure multiplied by the multiplier does not equal the net value of BR collected as the net value accounts for reliefs, collection costs,
adjudications
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Official Statistics 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 to 2015, author’s
construction
4 In terms of value, 55% of UK commercial property was rented in
2016 (PIA, 2017). This is a skewed statistic, given it reflects size, sector
and location as much as number of properties. Owner-occupiers should
have longer lasting gains from any SBRR reduction, as they will be
capitalized into higher property values.
5 Also see Bond et al. (2013) for work on capitalisation in Enterprise
Zones
6 Commercial research employing rental data finds 75% capitalisation
of BR over a period of two to three years (Regeneris, 2015)
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the level of (logarithmic) employment, for some grow-
ing firms. This indicates manufacturing occupiers still
bear some of the incidence. The authors suggest that
revaluation of a firm’s BR obligations following expan-
sion discourages the development of premises and
hence employment or encourage them to move to areas
with a lower BR. Although these factors will be limited
by high relocation costs and because any change in BR
will be net of the existing tax costs.
Duranton et al. (2011) find a positive but insignifi-
cant association between BR and entry into areas, after
matching entrants within 1 km, i.e. higher BR does not
deter entrants. They suggest that selection effects may
be driving these findings, with capital-intensive firms
leaving areas and opening up space for less capital-
intensive firms to enter, as commercial space is limited
in its supply response. This may be the case, although it
would suggest that the vacant space meets new occu-
pants’ needs in terms of facilities and access to markets.
More importantly, it indicates that there is some
capitalisation of BR into new rents, otherwise entry
would be in matched areas. In terms of local revenue,
we can speculate there would be a limited effect on tax
revenue and employment effects would depend on the
selection of firms (with young and expanding firms
entering as well as exiting) produced by relative BRs
and demand conditions across areas.
We cannot simply contribute to the literature on prop-
erty taxes and capitalisation in isolation if we are to
provide comprehensive analysis of the policy framework.
Integral to the policy and pressure from the business
community is the perceived need to target reductions on
small firms, which could transform local communities.
The narrative of transformative small firms implies that
SBRR reduces financial constraints and this drives
growth-enhancing pass through of lower prices or higher
quality. Alternatively or in combination, firms may exploit
market power and capture the tax reductions via increased
mark ups. The pass through would lead to increases in
market share at the expense of other firms, given there is
no general demand stimulus. Holtz-Eakin (2000, b) chal-
lenges this narrative, arguing studies that suggest finance
restrictions limit small firms have not shown too few or the
wrong firms are funded. This finding weakens the effi-
ciency arguments for intervention. Nightingale and Coad
(2013) and Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) show the distri-
bution of growth from small firms is skewed by a very
small proportion of high performing firms, away from the
vast majority, which produce much lower growth.
Consequently, we argue the principal recipients of SBRR
will be old small firms creating limited growth. Given
these findings, mark up increases would bemore prevalent
than pass through as small firms enjoy a softer budget
constraint aiding short-term survival, but not growth.
Reinforcing these conclusions is the output from
research exploiting rich firm level datasets. The output
frequently contests the perception that there is an inverse
relationship between firm size and net employment
growth (Nightingale and Coad 2013). Rijkers et al.
(2014), Lawless (2014) and Anyadike-Danes et al.
(2015) attribute this perception to the work of Birch in
the late 1970s. Birch’s work has subsequently been
criticised for its failure to account for attrition and its
ability to differentiate between gross and net flows.
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) using US Census Bureau
data and Huber et al. (2017) using Austrian data provide
the recent leading studies into net employment growth
that challenge the view on small firm employment
growth. Both these studies use a current average of
employment growth as the dependent variable, rather
than logarithmic change to overcome regression to
mean effects and enable an integrated approach to entry
and exit. They both employ a saturated non-parametric
OLS approach, whilst Huber et al. (2017) additionally
use their own two-step approach, which produces sim-
ilar findings. These authors find that once they control
for age, small firm’s average growth is lower than that of
larger firms, counter to the perception on which the
reliefs are based. These findings are robust across insti-
tutional frameworks with Rijkers et al. (2014) work in
Tunisia reaching similar conclusions. Haltiwanger et al.
(2013) find a very limited positive relationship with size
for firms with ten or more employees. This relationship
weakens for continuing firms. Huber et al. (2017) and
Rijkers et al. (2014) find a stronger relationship for all
firms, but again less so for continuing firms. Lawless
(2014) for Ireland finds that there is no systematic effect
of size, once she excludes the smallest firms.
These papers consistently show that small firms do
not drive growth because young firms, which tend to be
small, have a particularly large volatile effect on em-
ployment growth if they survive. These large effects
dissipate quickly. Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Rijkers
et al. (2014) and Lawless (2014) find that the effect of
youth is over by year 5. Huber et al. (2017) by about
year 3 and in periods of crisis slightly older firms may
contribute more to employment growth given their
greater stability.
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In terms of UK research on small firm employment
growth, Hijzen et al. (2010) argue that it is rather limited
and confined to the manufacturing sector. They also high-
light the important debate over the relevance of firm size in
employment growth is far fromdecided. These authors use
decomposition methods on the Inter-Departmental Busi-
ness register for the period 1997–2008. They conclude
small firms across a wide range of sectors contribute a
greater proportion of job creation than their employment
share and a slightly greater proportion of job destruction.
Overall, they find jobs created by small firms are no less
persistent than jobs created by large firms. These findings
are a little misleading for our purposes.
The findings need challenging. Firstly, they define
small firms as those which employ less than 100 people,
which seems unnecessary when the data contains finer
detail and is at odds with the finer groupings in the
papers cited above. De Wit and de Kok (2014) called
for more dynamic classification method when determin-
ing the contribution of small businesses towards job
creation. Thus, our research divides firms below 100
employees into four groups, 0–9, 10–19, 20–49 and 50–
99 to more clearly decipher growth patterns. Secondly,
they conflate age and entry. They show entrants, which
tend to be small, contribute a significant proportion of
growth. The introduction of age is one important addi-
tional firm characteristic, which even if it is not suffi-
cient to capture the complexity of dynamic firm envi-
ronments (Shane 2009; Anyadike-Danes et al. 2015), is
sufficient to empirically question the targeting of SBRR.
The literature underscores the clear and significant
disparities between basic tax theory, the evidence on
small firm’s transformative potential and the relevance
of the assumptions underpinning the homogeneous
SBRR policy. There are also clear points of contention
in the application of the property tax as; it leads to a
significant level of resistance, it is collected from a
group that is not aligned with the economic incidence
and it will limit the flexibility of local governments in
meeting local needs. Our strategy directly confronts
these disparities between the different literatures and
practice in order to comprehend how elements may
support but not inform policymaking.
4 Data source
Critical to our novel combination of literature to provide
comprehensive policy analysis is our access to rich
administrative data. We employ the ONS’ (2016) An-
nual Respondents Database X (ARDx) first released in
July 2016. The ARDx combines two existing surveys,
the Annual Business Inquiry (1998–2008) and the sub-
sequent Annual Business Survey (2009–2014). These
are the largest datasets collected by the ONS (62,000
questionnaires and over 600 variables) and firms’ rep-
resentatives are legally required to complete the instru-
ment.7 It is a census of firms with 250 plus employees
and a complex stratified sample across size, sector and
region of smaller firms. The sample framework is con-
structed using administrative data on employment and
turnover from PAYE and VAT8 registrations. This can
provide key information out of sample on changes in
these variables as well as on births of firms.
The power of the ARDx comes from the detailed
information on both the dynamics of firms (reporting
units) and their constituent units (local units). Access to
administrative unit level data means we can control for
mergers and acquisitions, which, if only observed at
firm level, would lead to spurious measures of employ-
ment change due to changes in firm structures rather
than true employment growth. Whilst data at parent
level enables us to control for growth within appropriate
age and size categories, as we can differentiate local unit
activity from that of small single unit firms. Consequent-
ly, we can identify firms’ organic growth, within appro-
priate classifications.
Firms report the BR paid in the survey period (Octo-
ber to October). This is not administrative data and
hence it comes with the usual survey reporting issues.
From this payment, we recover the rateable value and
calculate firm’s SBRR for those that observably meet
the SBRR criteria. Please see the appendix.
In line with the recent net job creation literature, our
dependent variable is the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)
net average job creation measure. This enables an inte-
grated treatment of entering, exiting and continuing
firms. It is a bounded symmetrical measure between
minus and positive two for exiting and entering firms,
between which we find net employment creation of
continuing firms. Frequently firm-level employment
growth is zero or negative and this precludes the use
7 Response rates vary by sector and year but overall oscillate between
the high 70 and low 80% ONS (2017).
8 PayAs You Earn (PAYE) tax returns are collected by employers from
each employee. Value Added Tax (VAT) registration is for firms above
a turnover threshold who must then collect the tax on the goods and
services they provide.
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of logarithmic differences. Huber et al. (2017),
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Tornqvist et al. (1985)
discuss the use of the current average to overcome
negative biases from using a base year size classifica-
tion, resulting from mean revision effects or positive
biases from an end year classifications.
At the local unit i, at time t, employment growth g is
measured as a change in employment L, from the pre-
ceding year relative to the average employment over
these years, i.e.
git¼ Lit−Lit−1ð Þ= 0:5 LitþLit−1ð Þð Þ ð1Þ
We aggregate eq. 1 up to the firm/reporting unit as a
weighted sum of local unit growth (gft) for the year in
which the firm f controls a given unit, i.e.
gft¼∑
it
0:5 LitþLit−1ð Þ= ∑
i∈ f
0:5 LitþLit−1ð Þ
 !
git ð2Þ
This weighted aggregation from local to firm level
allows us to account for a number of spurious changes in
growth stemming from changes in local unit ownership
as well as regression to the mean effects. The growth
changes at local units will be greater than for firms given
that the method accounts for within firm redistributions
as well as non-organic growth.9
In Fig. 1, we report the cumulative distributions of
employment growth by the level of relief in the 2005–
2013 period. We group firms by their maximum relief,
zero, up to 25, 50, 75 or 100%. We also explode the
central portion of these distributions between negative
and positive 0.2 growth, given their proximity. This
proximity of the distributions strongly suggests relief
has little or no systematic effect on employment growth.
The darker broader band represents those with zero
reliefs. These firms have the greatest proportion of firms
with negative growth, but also the largest proportion of
firms with positive growth. Over the range of positive
values, the differences from other groups, except that for
firms with up to 100% relief, are difficult to untangle.
Firms with up to 100% relief have the smallest propor-
tion of both negative and positive values. Only 20% of
this distribution reports positive current growth. The
pattern changes sharply as we approach the upper bound
of two, indicating there is a larger proportion of entrants
that qualify for the highest reliefs.
5 Empirical strategy
We employ a saturated OLS estimation framework of
interacted independent indicator variables10;
gft ¼ ∑
6
e¼2
βeSizeþ ∑
6
a¼2
βaAgeþ ∑
6
r¼2
βrSBRRþ ∑
3
n¼2
βnBRperiod
þ ∑
96
s¼2
βsSector þ ∑
15
y¼2
βyYear
þ ∑
τ
x¼2
βx Size;Age; SBRR;BRperiodð Þ þ ∑
ω
z¼2
Sector; Yearð Þ þ εft;
ð3Þ
where size is the vector of indicators, which varies with
the employment groupings of 0–9 employees, 10–19;
20–49; 50–99; 100–249 and 250 plus. Age is a vector of
the categories, entrants and years; 1; 2–4; 5–9; 10–19;
20 plus. The division provides detailed information on
the critical initial years of young firms. After year 1, the
other groupings are divided to give balanced numbers
and provide reliable estimates. SBRR captures categories
of percentage reliefs, i.e. zero, greater than zero to
< 25%; > 25% to < 50%; > 50% to < 75%; > 75% to
< 100%. The variable BRperiod separates the periods by
the revaluation periods 2000, 2005 and 2010. Sector is a
vector of indicators for 96 two-digit Standard Industrial
Classifications (SIC revision 2007). We include indica-
tors for the years 2000–2013, the period we use for the
analysis. We do not use the final year of 2014 in the
dataset in order to avoid conflation of all observations
and subsequent exits. The dataset does not give specific
information on local unit and firm exit. However, iden-
tifiers are specific to units and are not recycled, as such
we use exit from the sample frame as an indicator of
exit. The errors are Huber-White cluster robust errors as
observations within firms are unlikely to be
independent.
Initially, we estimate the average effects of size on
weighted employment before adding controls for Age to
assess its effect on the average adjusted effects for all
firms and just continuing firms. We then add the SBRR
and BRperiod indicator variables to estimate the average
9 In a firm’s year of birth there would be a missing value, consequently
we insert two if there is any employment or zero if none.
10 We undertook all work within the Secure ONS Virtual Microdata
Laboratory on Stata 14. This limited the number of variables. We
explored smaller divisions of firm size/age with greater saturation.
These produced results in line with this specification.
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effects of SBRR on current employment growth. Final-
ly, we focus on a subset of high growth firms, as defined
by the EUROSTAT-OECD (2007). These are firms,
excluding their year of entry, with three or more con-
secutive years of annualised employment growth of at
least 20%, and in the initial year at least ten employees.
Given the use of a bounded dependent variable, we
employ saturated models of the discrete variables, i.e. we
have coefficients for all main and interaction effects pos-
sible for all independent variables. Angrist and Pischke
(2009), Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Huber et al. (2017)
provide discussions on this approach, which provides a
best estimate of the examined variation in employment.
The downside is that we estimate a large number of
coefficients (our largest estimate has 1421 coefficients).
Consequently, we only report the average effects of prin-
cipal variable groupings, adjusted for interactions.
6 Findings
Table 2 contains the principal estimated average adjust-
ed effects of firm size and age. It also reports Wald tests
of the differences between average effects within each
variable grouping. In Fig. 2, we represent these out-
comes in a graphical format for easier comparisons.
In the results with no age controls, we simply explore
firm size and find that the smallest firms (0–9 em-
ployees) are associated with a level of growth that is
three times that of the next size grouping. The groups
with employees from 20 to 249 employees do not have
statistically different growth. However, the subsequent
inclusion of controls for the distribution of age produces
a dramatic shift in growth patterns.
The estimates with age group controls now show that
growth of the smallest firms, 0–9 and 10–19 employees
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is significantly lower than that of the other size groups
excluding the largest group for the firms with 250 plus
employees. There is no systematic size effect for firms
with 20 to 249 employees. The strong inverse relation-
ship between age and growth leads to this dramatic shift.
The average growth for entrants (year 0) is by definition
close to the upper bound of two and that for firms a year
after entry is still approximately a third of this level.
Thereafter, there is a sevenfold fall to the 2–4 years age
group and after 10 years, there is a marginally negative
but significant effect of age. The youth effect then
dissipates quickly for most firms.
Table 2 Adjusted average employment growth, with age controls
1: No age control 2: Age control 3: Continue onlya
Variable Average Effect Difference Testb Average Effect Difference Testb Average Effect Difference Testb
Size β/SE β/SE β/SE β/SE β/SE β/SE
0–9 0.229*** 0.214*** 0.094***
0.001 0 0
10–19 0.076*** − 0.153*** 0.229*** 0.015*** 0.111*** 0.018***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
20–49 0.077*** 0.001 0.284*** 0.055*** 0.164*** 0.052***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
50–99 0.078*** 0.001 0.271*** − 0.013*** 0.169*** 0.005
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004
100–249 0.073*** − 0.005 0.249*** − 0.022*** 0.151*** − 0.017***
0.002 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.006
250+ 0.083*** 0.009*** 0.204*** − 0.045*** 0.134*** − 0.017*
0.002 0.002 0.01 0.012 0.007 0.009
Age: Entrantc 1.971***
0.001
1 0.732*** − 1.239*** 0.768***
0.001 0.002 0.002
2–4 0.103*** − 0.629*** 0.118*** − 0.65***
0 0.001 0 0.002
5–9 0.022*** − 0.081*** 0.031*** − 0.087***
0 0 0 0.001
10–19 − 0.003*** − 0.025*** 0.003*** − 0.028***
0 0 0 0
20+ − 0.009*** − 0.006*** − 0.005*** − 0.008
0 0 0 0
Year Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.02 0.591 0.199
N 8,708,887 8,551,485 7,027,722
DF 1143 1172 1164
(β/SE) In each entry, the first row is the adjusted average and the second is the standard error ***1%; **5%; *10%
a Excludes entrants and final year of firms not subsequently in the sample frame
bWald test of the hypothesis there is no difference between successive averages
c Firm age in years
DF number of variables, Year: year controls, Sector: 96 2 digit SIC revision 2007controls
Source: ONS (2016) ARDX dataset, Author’s estimates
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Although the final patterns of average growth by size
and age are similar to that in the cited literature, we show
in Fig. 2a the shift in average size effects comes through
an increase in the average effects of larger firms, when
we hold the age distribution constant, rather than a large
reduction in the average effect of small firms. We pres-
ent both the adjusted average coefficients and graphics
with these same effects, whereas the cited authors do not
generally present the adjusted average effects and the
graphics are relative to the largest or oldest category. If
we had simply followed suit, then we would have also
presented similar findings, which seem to show a large
drop in the average growth effect of small firms.
Finally, for the estimates of continuing firms, i.e.
those that do not enter this period or leave in the next,
the number of observations falls by 18% to just over
seven million. The age effects follow a similar pattern to
the preceding estimates but there is a consistent uplift in
the scale of average effects reflecting the effect of exits
and older firms are still worse performers. The size
effects are all reduced in scale given the exclusion of
entrants. The pattern in coefficients is similar to the
preceding estimates, but differences are weaker. Firms
with at least 250 employees now have growth greater
than that the 0–9 and 10–19 employment reflecting the
stronger effect of entry on smaller firms’ rates.
The findings are consistent with the work of
Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Rijkers et al. (2014), Huber
et al. (2017), and in particular Lawless (2014), although
the shift in estimated size effects comes from increases for
firms with more than ten workers, rather than declines for
smaller firms. The findings are also in line with the broad-
brush findings of Hijzen et al. (2010) for the UK. They
established that firms with less than 100 employees in the
manufacturing and service sector grew more rapidly than
larger firms did. However, theywere not able to distinguish
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the patterns below this threshold or patterns among older
firms. They did not observe that the smallest firms, which
generally attract the highest reliefs, had the weakest mean
growth. This final point is in line with Anyadike-Danes
et al. (2015) and Nightingale and Coad (2013) who char-
acterise the population of small firms as dominated by a
large number of small old firmswhich contribute very little
to employment growth.
In Fig. 3 and Table 3, we report results incorporating the
SBRR and BR period controls for all firms, continuing
firms and a subset of high growth firms. Even though we
see a sharp reduction in the number of observations, small
firms continue to have significantly lower average adjusted
growth, but the size effects for groups with 20 to 249
employees are no longer significantly different from each
other. Age groups maintain the same inverse relationship,
but the decline between 1- and 2–4-year-old firms is now
by a factor of 5.4 for all firms and 5.25 for continuing
firms, rather than a factor of seven estimated above.
Importantly, the SBRR coefficients do not identify any
systematic effect on employment for all firms and continu-
ing firms. There is very little difference in mean effects for
firms receiving zero relief, through to those receiving 75%
relief. Thereafter, there is some evidence of lower growth
for those receiving up to 100% relief by between 11 and
16% to both the 75% and zero SBRR groups, respectively.
Consequently, we demonstrate that the tax mechanism is
ineffective in increasing employment and reliefs would
seem to capitalise into occupation costs.
Finally, we focus on the subgroup of high growth
firms. In Table 4, we group firms by the relief rates and
observe the proportions, which meet the high growth
criteria, decline rapidly from 8.5% for firms attracting
zero relief to around 0.5 of a percent for firms claiming
up to the maximum.11 Some care is needed with these
figures, given that the higher rates of relief will have
only been available from 2010 and as such will have
been initially affected by the 2007/8 recession. we iden-
tify gazelles, firms that become high growth before their
fifth birthday, these only constitute 0.98 of a percent of
pooled observations of firms between 3 and 7 years old,
whilst for older firms, the percentage is 1.85.
Given the size and age thresholds, the employment
estimates for high growth firms show a strong rise in
overall average effects relative to the preceding esti-
mates. Age is also less important, with a much shallower
decline as we move from 1-year-old firms to 1–4-year-
old firms of approximately 1.8, compared to the previ-
ously estimated fivefold decline in growth.
Importantly, we now find significant differences by
SBRR group. Firms that receive up to 25% relief have a
lower average adjusted effect than those firms that re-
ceive zero relief. Thereafter, the average growth effect is
significantly higher than both these groups, peaking for
firms with up to 75% relief. The estimated effect for the
100% relief group is now in line with the preceding two
groups rather than being significantly lower than all
other relief groups.
It would be difficult to say that there is a systematic
effect of SBRR on employment growth, given the find-
ings from the larger sample of all firms. This suggests that
we are picking up location effects for these very small
groups of firms (between 1.5 and 0.4% of observations),
which are stronger for those occupying cheaper or smaller
units. This is somethingwewish to examinewith detailed
geographical information in future research.
7 Conclusions
The “end of the national tax on local growth”may simply
reflect political rhetoric, yet the underlying policy per-
spective (Shane 2009) of taxation constraining transfor-
mative small firms pervades the supporting consultation
and policy documentation on SBRR (see HM Treasury
2016). In this paper, we confront the assumptions that
taxation restricts growth and small firms produce greater
growth than larger firms with rich firm level data.
We show that the chosen policy mechanism of prop-
erty tax reductions is not associated with employment
growth, which we argue reflects their capture by prop-
erty owners. It also suggests that this tax is unlikely to
have a long run effect on occupiers, as its level and
changes pass backwards via rents and building value
adjustments. The complications arise from the misalign-
ment of statutory and economic incidences. If property
owners became liable, the salience to firms would be
significantly reduced, as would the political pressure. It
would be clear the tax is on the economic rents (capital
gains), which in part derive from the social context
rather than a confusion with economic activity. Other
gains would be a return to a flat tax, as the power of
arguments for preferences declines and a fall in the
number of valuation appeals, if the reformed tax only
valued property.
11 Some firms have more than three years in which they are classified
as high growth
Small business property tax reductions and job growth
Yet, even if the SBRR had an effect on costs, the
target group would not provide any greater job creation,
once we simply account for age differences. We find
medium-sized firms provide greater and probably more
stable employment growth. Young firms also provide
strong employment growth, but this rapidly dissipates
and is conditional on these new firms surviving. There
may be a positive association between the larger reliefs
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
C
ur
re
nt
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t G
ro
w
th
0−9 10−19 20−49 50−99 100−249 250+
Firm Employment Size Group
SBRR Control All Continue Only
High Growth
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
C
ur
re
nt
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t G
ro
w
th
1 year 2−4 5−9 10−19 20+
Firm Age Group
All Firms Continue only
SBRR All firms  SBRR Continue Only
High Growth
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
C
ur
re
nt
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t G
ro
w
th
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
 Maximum SBRR Percent Groups
SBRR Control SBRR Continue Only
High Growth
3.1 Adjusted Average Growth by Size Groups, With Age & SBRR Controls 
3.2 Adjusted Average Growth, By Age Groups. All Estimates Excluding Entry 
3.3  Firm Employment Growth by Maximum SBRR
Fig. 3 Adjusted average growth
with SBRR controls. a Adjusted
average growth by size groups,
with age and SBRR controls. b
Adjusted average growth, by age
groups. All estimates excluding
entry. c Firm employment growth
by maximum SBRR. Note:
Continue denotes firms not in
their first year of operation or the
last year in the dataset. High
growth, EUROSTAT-OECD
(2007) definition. SBRR, esti-
mates include controls for SBBR
and age. Source: ARDX dataset,
Author’s estimates
M. Gobey, K. Matikonis
Table 3 Adjusted average employment growth, with SBRR controls
4: Full model 5: Continuea 6: High growth
Variable Average Differenceb Average Differenceb Average Differenceb
Size: 0–9 0.116*** 0.071*** 0.360***
0.001 0.001 0.028
10–19 0.160*** 0.044*** 0.114*** 0.043*** 0.315*** − 0.044
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.031
20–49 0.179*** 0.019*** 0.132*** 0.018*** 0.374*** 0.059***
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.014
50–99 0.173*** − 0.006 0.135*** 0.003 0.357*** − 0.017
0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.012
100–249 0.180*** 0.006 0.136*** 0.002 0.383*** 0.026**
0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.012
250 0.160*** − 0.02* 0.123*** − 0.013 0.336*** − 0.047***
0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.01
Entrant 1.887***
0.009
Age 1 0.832*** − 1.056*** 0.844*** 0.789***
0.01 0.014 0.011 0.081
Age 2–4 0.153*** − 0.679*** 0.160*** − 0.684*** 0.442*** − 0.346***
0.003 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.022 0.084
Age 5–9 0.073*** − 0.079*** 0.078*** − 0.081*** 0.367*** − 0.075**
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.01 0.024
Age 10–19 0.039*** − 0.034*** 0.041*** − 0.037*** 0.347*** − 0.02*
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011
Age: 20 + 0.023*** − 0.016*** 0.025*** − 0.016*** 0.351*** 0.004
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006
SBRRc: Zero 0.142*** 0.099*** 0.352***
0.001 0.001 0.004
SBRR 25% 0.135*** − 0.007 0.092*** − 0.008* 0.265*** − 0.087***
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.037 0.038
SBRR 50% 0.140*** 0.006 0.096*** 0.004 0.442*** 0.177***
0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.044 0.057
SBRR 75% 0.142*** 0.002 0.100*** 0.004 0.674*** 0.232***
0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.056 0.069
SBRR 100% 0.129*** − 0.013** 0.084*** − 0.016 0.408*** − 0.266***
0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.027 0.062
R2 0.416 0.142 0.354
N (DF) 900,101 (1421) 795,871 (1381) 23,413 (1129)
The first row is the adjusted average and second is the standard error ***1%; **5%; *10%
a Excludes entrants and final year of firms not subsequently in the sample frame
bWald test of the hypothesis there is no difference between successive adjusted averages
c SBRR category numbers indicate upper bound of mutually exclusive groups
(DF): number of variables, estimates include year, BR period and 96 2 digit SIC (2007) controls
Source ONS (2016) ARDX dataset, Author’s estimates:
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and high growth firms’ employment, but identifying this
small number of firms’ ex-ante is problematic.
In line with Holtz-Eakin (2000, b), Shane (2009),
Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) and Fotopoulos and
Storey 2018, we conclude generic reliefs based on
naïve assumptions about homogeneous jobs and
supply side restrictions do not facilitate employment
growth. Institutional frameworks, which target time
constrained assistance on specific complex and
shifting productivity and growth constraints as well as
the quality and stability of employment may be better
alternatives, but these require a richer understanding of
firm level dynamics. The OECD (2015) document some
viable alternatives that do not erode tax bases. Even
these interventions cannot succeed in isolation. They
need well-developed local and inclusive infrastructure,
education and healthcare and rigorous sectoral analysis
if they are to succeed. These factors require locally
directed provision, which in turn requires a stable and
diversified tax base.
In addition to research on the local business context,
both the individual firms and institutional framework
provide opportunities for further research. We are al-
ready exploring whether SBRR has any effect on firm
level productivity and survival, see Matikonis and
Gobey (2019). Research into the mechanisms underly-
ing capitalisation has been limited given the lack of
access to detailed data. This will soon be resolved as
VOA (ND) 2010 and 2017 compiled rating lists now
include data down to local units on the characteristics
and valuations of rateable properties. If matched with
the ARDX data, there will soon be a sufficient period
over which rent reviews, relocations, use and investment
in spaces and indeed cyclical shifts in the lengths of
tenures can be explored to establish the pace, scale and
distribution of capitalisation’s costs and benefits. At the
institutional level, local authorities will become fully
dependent on local domestic and business property
taxes rather than transfers, and this may shift the
relative influence of local voters and business owners.
For example, Asatryan et al. (2017) found in Germany
that business taxes rather than personal taxes rose in
response to improvements in local democracy. In the
UK, this may be particularly interesting, given the much
greater reliance on property taxes than in other OECD
countries.
Appendix
Recovery of Business Rates paid by firms:
BR ¼ Rv Mð Þ 1−SBRRð Þ; ðA1Þ
where BR is what is paid, RV is Rateable Value,M is the
multiplier in the relevant year and SBRR is the propor-
tionate level of relief. In order to reduce the number of
unknown values, we first define the SBRR in terms of
Rateable Value and the interval (int) over which the
relief declines from a maximum (Mx) value of either
50%, or 100% to zero and insert this into eq. 1, i.e.:
SBRR ¼ Mx 1− Rv
int
−1
  
; if Rv≤2 intð Þ
SBRR ¼ Mx 2− Rv
int
  ðA2Þ
Placing eq. 2 in equation one, we get:
BR ¼ Mð ÞRv 1−Mx 2− Rv
int
  
BR ¼ Mð ÞRv−2Mx Mð Þ Rvð Þ þ Mx Mð Þ Rv
2ð Þ
int
; if Rv < 2 intð Þ
ðA3Þ
Given the maximum relief (Mx) can only take two
values we can simplify and solve for rateable value in
each case. First when maximum relief is 0.5, for the
period 2005–2009:
BR ¼ Mð ÞRv− Mð Þ Rvþ Mx Mð Þ Rv
2ð Þ
int
BR ¼ Rv2 Mx Mð Þ
int
Rv ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
NDRð Þint
Mx Mð Þ
s ðA4Þ
Table 4 High growth firms, proportion of pooled observations by
relief level 2000–2013
SBRR maximum Proportion high growth
0 0.085
25% 0.018
50% 0.015
75% 0.006
100% 0.004
Some firms will have more than the minimum 3 years of
annualised growth of 10%, entrants excluded. Source ONS
(2016) ARDX dataset, author’s calculations
M. Gobey, K. Matikonis
Then when the maximum value is one for the period
2010–2017. In this case, we find the rateable value via
the positive route of the quadratic in eq. 5. Once these
steps are completed, the calculation of relief in a given
year is quite straightforward.
BR ¼ Mð ÞRv−2 Mð ÞRvþ Mð ÞRv
2
int
BR ¼ − Mð ÞRvþ Mð ÞRv
2
int
0 ¼ Mð Þ
int
Rv2− Mð ÞRv−NDR
ðA5Þ
If a firm meets the criteria for SBRR and has paid
zero BR we assume the relief is 100%.12 We place the
recovered rateable value and associated SBRR into fac-
tor variables in order to implement our saturated OLS
model approach and to recognise that there may be some
errors in the collection BR paid data, as is survey rather
than administrative data.
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